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Abstract
This paper surveys some of the mechanisms that have been proposed by the experimental literature to elicit social networks.
These mechanisms differ in their incentive structures, as well as the means of reward they employ. We compare these
elicitation devices on the basis of the estimated differences in the characteristics of the induced networks, such as the
number of (mutual) links, correspondence and accuracy. Our main conclusion is that the elicited network architecture is itself
dependent on the structure (and the nature) of the incentives. This, in turn, provides the social scientist with guidelines on the
most appropriate device to use, depending on her research objectives.
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Introduction
There is a growing literature that highlights the importance
of networks in our social and economic life. These works ex-
perimentally explore how social networks influence behavior
in a wide variety of environments, from job search to infor-
mation transmission within firms, when it becomes crucial to
understand how networks’ architecture influences individual
behavior and, vice versa, what is the impact of individuals’
decisions on the network’s structure and performance1.
The aim of this paper is to survey the –rather scarce– lit-
erature that looks at various mechanisms to elicit real (rather
than fictitious, or artificially created in the lab) social net-
works. The latter are, mainly, friendship networks. These
mechanisms vary from simple surveys (in which subjects are
just requested to name their friends without incentives) to
more sophisticated devices in which network elicitation takes
place under simple incentive schemes, designed to induce
subjects to truthfully reveal the network of their social rela-
tionships. These mechanisms employ heterogeneous means
of reward (from financial incentives, to exam grades) and rely
on different coordination devices.
Clearly, any empirical analysis on social networks cru-
cially depends on the elicitation device being used. This con-
sideration notwithstanding, in all the cited papers the mecha-
nism design problem associated with real-life network elici-
tation is kept in the background: once the network topology
has been mapped explicitly, this is when the action starts.
Nonetheless, the basic message of this paper is that friendship
1 See the surveys of Vega-Redondo (2007), Goyal (2007) and Jackson
(2010).
is a subjective domain, in that individuals may perceive their
social ties asymmetrically, as well as of a different intensity.
This, in turn, makes the exercise of network elicitation subject
to significant measurement errors. When economic incentives
are employed –not surprisingly– the elicited network archi-
tecture is itself dependent on the nature (and the structure) of
these incentives2. In this respect, this paper provides the social
scientist with guidelines on the most appropriate elicitation
device to use, depending on the research main objectives.
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows. Sec-
tion surveys the various devices employed for network elic-
itation, while in Section we look at their differences from
the viewpoint of mechanism design, by comparing the incen-
tive structures of the induced game-forms. Section reports
our empirical findings, confirming our main conjecture: net-
work architecture strongly depends upon the characteristics
of the elicitation device. Finally, Section concludes. The
Supplementary Materials online contains further design de-
tails, experimental instructions and graphs of representative
networks.
Network elicitation mechanisms
This section describes the most popular devices for real-life
network elicitation, ordered by their complexity. Starting
from non incentivized surveys, we move toward simple strate-
gic schemes in which network elicitation is rewarded with
different means and relies on different coordination patterns.
2 Along these lines, see also Comola and Fafchamps (2014)
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Non-incentivized devices
What we know about social networks in Sociology comes
from non-incentivized surveys in which subjects are asked
to list their friends (see, among others, Barabasi and Albert
(1999). We will refer to them as HYPS devices (the acronym
refers to the “hypothetical” nature of rewards, which is the
term being used in Experimental Economics to indicate the
absence of incentives).
The combination of behavioral and survey data has been
extremely useful in studying, for instance, the interplay be-
tween social ties and behavioral traits among teenagers: edu-
cational aspiration levels, political orientation, consumption
of marijuana, crime and so forth. These studies have been use-
ful in understanding people’s tendency to link with those who
display similar behavioral traits, namely, homophily (Jackson
and Rogers 2007) and the strong preference for cliques: in-
dividuals prefer to link with those who are already linked to
each other (Goeree et al. 2010).
Banerjee et al. (2013) use a non-inventivized mechanism
to elicit central individuals in a social network3. Their goal
is to develop a micro-finance program in some villages in
India through central individuals in the network. In an exten-
sive survey they include a section that collects social network
data along 12 dimensions: names of those who visit the re-
spondent’s home, those whose homes the respondent visits,
non-relatives with whom the respondent socializes, etc. Indi-
viduals are allowed to name as many as five to eight network
neighbors, depending on the category. The data exhibit almost
no “top-coding”: less than 10% of the respondents names the
maximum number of individuals in any single category.
However, HYPS networks are not exempt from problems.
For instance, it is unclear whether individuals’ responses are
more likely to represent the desire to establish a link with
others (“aspirational” friendships) rather than to flag a “real”
relationship. It is also unclear whether misreported links are
due to a desire for privacy.
Benefit-Your-Friend
The Benefit-Your-Friend (hereafter BYF) protocol has been
first proposed by Bran˜as-Garza et al. (2010). In essence, BYF
is a survey with social incentives, in the sense that subjects
do not receive any direct reward for naming a friend, but give
the latter some chance to be rewarded by having been named.
The protocol is extremely simple: subjects are asked to write
down the name of their friends from the same undergraduate
class on a piece of paper. As it is stated in the instructions,
“there is a chance that one of them will be benefited later in the
experiment”. No further information is provided at that stage
on the type of decisions subjects would make afterwards, or
what these future benefits might be: participants are not aware
of the nature of the rewards and, therefore, cannot condition
3 Betweenness centrality is an index which measures how “central” each
subject is in the network by counting the number of shortest paths connecting
any pair of nodes in the network which pass through that particular subject.
To obtain this index, we need to look at the entire network architecture,
instead of simply considering the local properties of a given node.
their “eliciting strategy” to this information. As a result, it is
very unlikely that this mechanism yields a social network of
subjects with specific needs (money, grades, etc...).
On the other hand, BYF aims at revealing the identity
of “close friends”. The instructions clearly state that subjects
might be given the chance to benefit “only one of their friends”,
randomly selected from the list. Therefore, the higher the
number of friends they list, the lower the chance of benefiting
any one of them.
Coordination Game I
The first example of an incentivized mechanism comes from
Leider et al. (2009). Its challenging results motivated this
literature, whose aim is to design incentive-compatible mech-
anisms to induce subjects to truthfully reveal the complex
network underlying their social relations.
Leider et al. (2009) develop an elicitation protocol based
on a simple coordination game, we call it COORD-I, with the
following rules: i) participation is voluntary, with recruitment
conducted via the Internet; ii) COORD-I is a coordination
game by which each subject has to pick the name of her ten
best friends from a list of students of two university dorms,
together with an estimate of the time spent together with each
of them; iii) the outcome function of the mechanism is as
follows: all links are checked, yielding a lottery by which
subjects are rewarded with a prize of 50 cents with a 50%
chance if the link is reciprocated, and nothing otherwise. If
the difference in the reported time spent together (per week) is
lower than one hour, the winning probability is raised to 75%.
Leider et al. (2009) also use a variation of this elicitation
device: iv) subjects have to name their best ten friends about
whom they would answer some questions in the following
weeks. For each correct question both friends answer, they
both receive a prize. In this way, participants have incentives
to name those friends they know sufficiently well.
Cobo-Reyes and Jime´nez (2012) employ a mechanism,
COORD-II, that can be thought as an intermediate device
between BYF and COORD-I. Like in BYF, only one link is
checked at random for payment; like in COORD-I, a link is
rewarded only if it is reciprocated. Extensive information
about this device is provided in the Appendix.
There are some important innovations in COORD-II with
respect to COORD-I: i) recruitment is not voluntary but partic-
ipation is; ii) to be rewarded, links have to be reciprocated with
sufficiently close precision (mutual perception of “strength”
of the friendship: a subjective assessment on a scale from
0=“no friendship” to 4=“close friendship”); iii) subjects are
also allowed not to name anyone and still receive the full
prize.
In addition, COORD-II varies between subjects the means
of reward: no reward (TN), monetary reward (TM, 5 e)
and class points (TP). Clearly, different reward means may
elicit different networks with different characteristics, as they
trigger different domains of friendship relationships.
Table 1 summarizes the different design features of the
Eliciting real-life social networks: a guided tour — 3/7
elicitation devices surveyed in this paper.
Table 1. Features of the elicitation mechanisms
Mech. Inc. SymmL IRL Exit Option
HYPS No No - -
BYF No No - -
COORD-I Yes Yes Yes No
COORD-II Yes Yes No Yes
Note: Mech. refers to Mechanism and Inc. to Incentives,
SymmL to Symmetric links, IRL to Increasing reward with links
Theoretical conjectures
There is a variety of reasons why subjects would prefer (or
not) to coordinate in each of these friendship elicitation games.
We do not only consider problems related to coordination
failure, but also those related to the means of reward and
social preferences, like envy or altruism.
Coordination and symmetry
We have already noticed that both COORD-I and COORD-II
–as opposed to HYPS and BYF– reward reciprocal elicitation.
Even more, using two different devices (one more “objec-
tive”, as time spent together, one more “subjective”, as the
subjective assessment of the “strength” of the relationship),
both mechanisms provide incentives to elicit symmetric re-
lationships (i.e., relationships that are perceived as similar
by both parties involved). This is natural for any elicitation
device based on coordination, where we expect subjects to
disregard links that may be lived of a different intensity by
either party. Whether asymmetric relationships may play a
role in the topics object of study by the cited papers is open
to discussion. Nevertheless, we may expect asymmetric rela-
tionships to be underestimated by any elicitation device that
relies on coordination. The reason is that only when the two
subjects who are part of the link name each other, the link is
considered in the network (this is, by definition, a symmetric
–or undirected– network).
Rewards
In BYF participants do not know the nature of the rewards
(monetary, grades, etc.) their named friends could enjoy in
the future. As a result, it is very unlikely that this mechanism
elicits a network of those friends who need anything specific,
whether money or grades.
In addition, in COORD-II there are two different means
of reward: money or grades. Before providing any conjecture
about differences in behavior due to a difference in rewards,
we should focus our attention on the effect of the “exit option”
of naming no friends in this mechanism. If a subject believes
that a friend may name her, she should reciprocate in order to
avoid her friend to lose the reward. Therefore, if participants
think that their friends are in need of money or class points
they should not name them, since those friends can assure
themselves the maximum payoff for not naming anybody. In
this sense, it is likely that the means of reward affect the “type”
of friends participants decide not to name.
All links vs. 1
As we already discussed, one important difference between
COORD-I and both BYF and COORD-II is that, in the for-
mer, all elicited links are payoff relevant, instead of just one,
picked at random. This, in turn, implies that, in COORD-I,
expected monetary payoffs are increasing in the number of
elicited links. In other words, COORD-I is meant to map
a social network “as dense as possible”. Given this design
feature, we can expect subjects to name as many friends as
possible, not just very close ones. By contrast, both BYF and
COORD-II limit to one the number of checked links, forcing
subjects to disregard their “marginal” social relationships (i.e.,
“acquaintances”).
Social preferences I: unconditional altruism
As we mentioned in Section , in BYF subjects do not receive
a reward by naming a friend. Instead, they grant the latter
with the possibility of a future reward. Therefore, the extent
to which BYF may outperform HYPS lies in the degree of
unconditional altruism (see, e.g., Cox et al. 2007) subjects
hold with respect to their friends, that may be exploited by the
eliciting device.
Social preferences II: guilt aversion
As we discussed earlier, COORD-II allows for the possibility
of ensuring the full prize by simply not naming anyone. This
is labelled as “Case 1” in the experimental instructions (see the
Appendix). Cobo-Reyes and Jime´nez (2012) introduce this
rule for ethical reasons, since they collect this very sensitive
information during the standard activities of an undergraduate
class (even more in the case of TP, which was administered
during the final exam). Remember that, in the experiment,
although participation was voluntary, recruitment was not.
In this sense, the authors acknowledge that the “exit option”
embodied in Case 1 may induce subjects to underreport their
friendship network. In game-theoretic terms, under “selfish
preferences” (i.e., assuming that subjects are only concerned
in maximizing the probability of winning the prize), Case 1
corresponds to a weakly dominant strategy, since it guaran-
tees the highest monetary prize, independently of the others’
behavior. On the other hand, the working conjecture of Cobo-
Reyes and Jime´nez (2012) is that the impact of Case 1 would
be limited if subjects hold social preferences (i.e., if they are
also concerned about the monetary payoffs of their friends).
The argument is straightforward: if subjects hold sufficiently
strong beliefs that they would be named by their friends, not
reciprocating them will turn them down. To the extent to
which subjects exhibit social preferences (in the special form
of guilt aversion, see Charness and Dufwenberg 2006) this
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breaks weak dominance of Case 14. In fact, it can be shown
that the above argument is not restricted to guilt aversion, but
is applicable to a wider class of social preferences functions,
such those, for example, of Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton
and Ockenfels (2000), Martı´ (2007) or Sobel (2005).
Loss aversion
A different explanation of the features of the network elicited
by COORD-II that also relies on the exit option of not naming
any friend, is loss aversion. Participants who are loss averse
will name a lower number of friends (than those who are loss
neutral) and they should mainly name their close friends who
will be more likely to risk a safe payoff for them.
Different means of reward
As we discussed, COORD-II is played under three increasing
levels of incentives: no reward (TN), monetary reward (TM,
5 e) and class points (TP)5. We conjecture (and find) that,
increasing the value of the prize may amplify the effects of
the strategic properties of COORD-II. We provide in the Ap-
pendix a sample of network maps for each treatment, together
with some classical measures extracted from these graphs.
Results
This section reports the main estimated differences in the
network characteristics. We first look at out-degree, that is,
the number of links (i.e., elicited friends) starting from any
given node, moving then to link correspondence and strength.
Out-degree
Figure 1 compares the out-degree distribution in Kovarik et
al. (2012) using BYF in a network of 291 students with that
in Kovarik et al. (forthcoming), elicited by way of HYPS in a
network of 208 individuals.
As Figure 1 shows, BYF yields a network with a lower
number of links per capita. Interestingly, this does not trans-
late into differences in terms of corresponded links, where
relative frequencies sum up to 42.5% and 39% for HYPS and
BYF, respectively6.
4 Although a strategy profile in which everybody conforms to Case 1 still
remains a strict Nash equilibrium of the induced game, it is not necessarily
the most efficient one.
5 A rough calculation shows that an extra point in the final exam may be
much more valuable than 5 e. In Spain, students pay tuition fees per credit.
The fee for a 6-credit course (1 credit = 10 hour), such as Micro II at the
University of Granada, is approx. 60 e. Given past exam history, we can
estimate at approximately 15% the ex-ante probability of a student obtaining
a grade of 4 to 5 (that is, a grade for which the extra point would be crucial
for passing the exam) and another 5% the ex-ante probability of receiving
a grade of 8 to 9 (that is, a grade for which 1 grade higher would imply
Distinction, which in the Spanish university system implies 6 free credits
in the following academic year). As rough as this calculation could be, this
adds up to a 20% probability of the extra-point being worth 60 euros, with an
expected benefit of 0.2×60 =12 e. This in only a lower-bound, in fact, the
value of 1 extra-credit is definitely larger for many students
6 Note that the goal of this network mechanism is to elicit the central
individuals of the network and not close friends or acquaintances (like in the
other devices). In this sense, this networks is not really comparable with the
others.
Figure 1. Average distribution of out-degree with 95%
confidence intervals: BYF vs HYPS.
Result 1: BYF, compared with HYPS, yields subjects to name
fewer subjects.
Figure 2 reports the out-degree distributions in COORD-
II conditional upon the means of rewards: no rewards (TN),
monetary rewards (TM) and exam points (TP). As Figure 2
shows, the link distribution of TP is “more uniform” and with
a wider support than that of TM. Another interesting feature
is that about 10% of the participants do not name anybody
in both TM and TN. This is the same percentage we found
for BYF and HYPS (see Figure 1). Surprisingly, we find
that nobody in TP opt for the “safe” option of naming no
friends. We also see that TN and TM are not that different
in terms of links per capita (z = 0.399; prob = 0.6897 two-
tailed test) whether TP is distinct, as it provides a larger out-
degree average [TP vs. TM z = 6.502 (prob = 0.000, one-
tailed) and TP vs. TN z = 6.930 (prob = 0.000, one-tailed
test)]. We conjecture that this is a direct consequence of the
incentives scheme: guilt aversion is larger in TP, where the
most valuable reward being is being used.
A simple summary of average results (pooling data from
different treatments) indicates that COORD-II does not in-
duce naming, compared with the other elicitation devices.
Less than 10% of subjects name 6 or more friends while in
COORD-I average and modal out-degree is 107. Although
TP is the incentive scheme in COORD-II that induces highest
link elicitation, still it stays far from the figures of COORD-I.
Result 2: COORD-II elicits fewer links per capita compared
with COORD-I.
Result 2 holds independently on the mean of rewards
being employed. As Figure 2 shows, nobody in TP (and a very
small percentage in TM, 7%) opts for the weakly dominant
7 Note that this is due to the rules of the mechanism which allow to name
a maximum number of ten friends.
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Figure 2. COORD-II: distributions of out–degree with 95%
confidence intervals by incentive scheme.
strategy of Case 1. In addition, 174 participants in TP and
TM who name at least one link are reciprocated at least once.
This confirms our “social preference” conjecture.
Link correspondence and strength
We now compare the various mechanisms with respect of their
likelihood in obtaining mutual (that is, reciprocated) links as
a proxy of their performance. Since the probability of two
subjects naming each other at random with sufficiently close
strength is basically null, if the rate of mutual links captured
by a mechanism is sufficiently high, we can then claim that,
for that mechanism, most of the links correspond to “true
friendships”.
We are also interested in looking at the extent to which
the differences in the design of COORD-II, compared with
COORD-I and BYF, translate into differences in the estimated
link correspondence. Recall that the main differences between
COORD-II and COORD-I is that the former provides an exit
option (Case 1) and, in general, lower incentives to name many
friends (given the fact that only one link is paid off). Therefore,
we expect COORD-II to capture “strong” relationships, with
average elicited links lower than in COORD-I. Regarding
the comparison between COORD-II and BYF, in the latter
subjects do not lose any money if the link they send is not
reciprocated, so we also expect a lower average out-degree
–and higher frequency of mutual links– in COORD-II.
Table SM-1 (see Supplementary Materials) looks at the
likelihood of COORD-II in obtaining mutual links in the seven
networks under consideration. The first three columns of Ta-
ble SM-1 correspond to data from TP (TP1 to TP3), while
column µTP reports treatment averages. Columns 5 to 8 cor-
respond to the TM sessions (plus treatment average, µTM),
while the last column summarizes TN statistics. Corresponded
links in each network are partitioned into three categories ac-
cording with the difference in strength (D = 0, D = 1 and
D>1). As Table SM-1 shows, almost 74% and 72% of the
links are reciprocated in TP and TM, respectively, while only
5% of the links are reciprocated in TN8. Recall that COORD-I
shows 37% of mutual links, while this frequency is a bit larger
in case of BYF: 50% in Bran˜as-Garza et al. (2010) and 42.5%
in Kovarik et al. (2012). Goeere et al. (2010) find a coordi-
nation rate of around 50% within a subject pool of children
using a survey. All in all, we can say that COORD-II with
incentives (TP and TM) provides higher correspondence than
COORD-I and BYF. So, we can conclude that the COORD-II
is more likely to identify mutual links.
Result 3: Incentivized COORD-II mechanisms elicit recipro-
cated relations “of close friends”.
Kovarik et al. (forthcoming) find an average degree of
correspondence of 39.5% in four (HYPS) networks containing
208 students who sent 1158 links (5.56 links per capita, see
Figure 1). This percentage is much larger than the 5% of
correspondence found in TN.
Figure 3 reports the relative frequency of each positive
strength across TP, TM and TN9. As Figure 3 shows, the
number of links associated with “acquaintance” relationships
–that is, relationships with a strength not higher than 2– in
TP is very small (4% and 11% of the total, respectively).
Moreover, the frequencies of links associated to “friendships”
(strength = 3) and “close friendships” (strength = 4) are very
similar (45% and 40%, respectively)10. Recall that setting a
strength equal to 4 is weakly dominated by setting it equal to
3 (see the Appendix).
Regarding TM, Figure 3 shows that the links associated to
“acquaintance” relations are also low (similar to the figures in
TP, 4% and 11%, respectively). Instead, frequencies of links
with strength equal to 3 and 4 are different (50% and 35%,
respectively) and this difference is statistically significant (see
footnote 10), showing the weak dominance of strategy of
setting the strength equal to 3.
Result 4: COORD-II mostly captures reciprocated relations
of “close friends” (especially in TP).
Discussion
Elicitation is the preliminary step of any empirical analysis
of social networks, whatever is the specific object of research.
This consideration notwithstanding –with very few exceptions–
the growing empirical literature on social networks seems to
disregard the most obvious insights from mechanism design
and consider the elicited networks as exogenously determined,
8 We do not find differences between treatments TP and TM (z = 0.160,
prob = 0.873, two-tailed test) while strong differences emerge between TP
vs. TN (z = 9.956, prob = 0.000, two-tailed test) and TM vs TN (z = 9.834,
prob = 0.000, two-tailed test).
9 The displayed frequency of TP and TM is an average of the three
sessions conducted for each treatment.
10 In fact we do not find any significant difference between number of
links with strength 3 and 4 in TP z = 0.601 (prob = 0.548, two-tailed test)
but strong differences in TM z = 2.473 (prob = 0.013, two-tailed test).
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Figure 3. Fraction of links corresponding to acquaintances
or friends with 95% confidence intervals: TP, TM & TN.
independently on the objectives of the researcher and the
methodologies being employed. This paper fills a gap in the
current debate by reporting on four different devices to elicit
real-life social networks and accounting for their differences
in the methodology being employed, and the observed differ-
ences in the network characteristics. Table 2 summarizes our
main findings.
1. HYPS is fairly good in terms of links per capita (out-
degree), although link correspondence is relatively small.
2. BYF is not very efficient in term of links per capita
and mutual links. However, it is extremely simple to
implement.
3. COORD-I can be useful to obtain a directed network,
that is, a graph with a high number of asymmetric links.
In other words, COORD-I is optimal if the researcher
wants to elicit large networks (taking into account that
COORD-I provides higher incentives for naming as
many links as possible).
4. COORD-II seems to work better to obtain a higher
percentage of corresponded links, that is, a non directed
network. The limitation of using COORD-II is that we
must have a closed environment in order to have the
whole network participating at the same time (take, for
example a classroom, or a company).
In sum, depending on the researchers’ objectives, one
mechanism turns out to be better than the others, with no
“clear winner” on all dimensions. COORD-I is better when a
large network with a high number of nodes is needed and the
fact that the induced network is directed (i.e., with a relatively
small number of corresponded links) is not important (take, for
example, the analysis of individual behavior in non-strategic
environments).
Table 2. A comparison among elicitation devices
Incent. Links Strength Mutual N
BYF e 220 0/1 45% 79
HYPS no 1753 0/1 39% 398
COORD-I e 5690 0/1 37% 569
COORD-II e 133 0 to 4 74% 58
COORD-II Points 202 0 to 4 74% 45
COORD-II no 103 0 to 4 5% 40
By contrast, COORD-II seems more appropriate when an-
alyzing strategic environments and games played in pairs (i.e.,
when there is interaction between players), since, if we want
to analyze how pairs of friends play a specific game, we need
bidirectional links to ensure that both members of the pair are
friends and there is no deception. Finally, the non-incentivized
mechanisms, such as BYF and HYPS, seem to work worse
than COORD-I and COORD-II in terms of the number of
elicited links, although they are easier to implement.
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Appendix: COORD-II
COORD-II: design details
The game-form of COORD-II is as follows. Students are
asked to reveal the full names of their friends in their under-
graduate class, jointly with a subjective evaluation (“strength”)
of each relationship. Let si j define the strength reported by i to
the i− j relationship, framed in the experimental instructions
as follows: si j = 1: j is a person i “hardly knows”; si j = 2: j
is “an acquaintant”; si j = 3: j is “a friend”; si j = 4: j is “a
close friend”. Finally, if subject i does not name subject j, let
si j = 0. As for the outcome function, subjects receive a prize
if one of the following two cases holds:
Case 1 they do not name anybody, or
Case 2 they name at least one subject. In this case, one of the
elicited links is checked at random (each link being se-
lected with equal probability). Let jˆ denote the subject
associated with the randomly selected link. Subject i
receives the prize if both rules are satisfied:
R1: also jˆ has also named i as a friend (i.e. only if
s jˆi , 0);
R2: friendship strength assessment should also be suf-
ficiently accurate, since, to ensure payment, the
difference in the reported strengths should not be
higher than 1: Di jˆ = |si jˆ− s jˆi| ≤ 1.
Case 1 corresponds to an “exit-option”,while Case 2 re-
calls the coordination device employed in COORD-I.
To sum up, COORD-II modifies COORD-I in the follow-
ing dimensions.
a) First, subjects play the elicitation protocol simultane-
ously, that is, they have basically no possibility to co-
ordinate their actions (something that can easily done
in COORD-I, where elicitation takes place via Inter-
net, with absolutely no control on the experimenter’s
behalf).
b) Recruitment in COORD-II is not voluntary, as network
elicitation takes place during regular teaching sessions
(or even during final exams (treatment TP, see the Ap-
pendix). This allows (almost) full participation of the
social group under scrutiny, as voluntary recruitment
may imply self-selection issues affecting the network
mapping through channels outside the experimenter’s
control.1
c) In addition to the standard written consent, to further
preserve our subjects’ rights of privacy that may be
infringed by the non-voluntary recruitment protocol (a
fortiori, when elicitation takes place during a regular
exam), an “exit option” is introduced (CASE 1) built in
the same system of incentives.
d) COORD-II allows to assess the effect of changes in the
means of reward, as it comes under three alternative
treatments, depending on the nature of the prize. The
baseline treatment, TP, involves the use of 1 extra-credit
point (out of 10) in the final exam grading; in treatment
TM the prize corresponds to 5 e; while in treatment
TN there is no prize at all.
Treatments and subjects
As we just mentioned, Cobo-Reyes and Jime´nez (2000) con-
duct three treatments which differed only in terms of the nature
of rewards: extra-credit points (TP), a monetary reward (TM)
and no incentives (TN).
In the three TP sessions (TP1, 2 and 3), subjects could
gain an additional point (out of 10) for a final “bonus question”
on the exam. To check the robustness of our their results to
the change in rewards, they also run 4 additional sessions.
Sessions TM1, 2 and 3 use a monetary prize (5 e), while the
last –treatment TN - uses no reward at all. Instructions for all
the treatments were identical, except for the description of the
outcome (reward) function.
All the sessions were non-computerized classroom exper-
iments conducted with subjects with no (or minimal) prior
1Voluntary participation was still ensured by the fact that all subjects were
asked to give their written consent (and, therefore, they could still refuse to
participate in the experiment).
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Figure 1. Resulting network using point rewards (TP2): 51 subjects and 165 links
exposure to game theory. The three TP sessions were con-
ducted in June 2004 during the Microeconomics II exam; a
first-year undergraduate course in economics at the University
of Jaen, Spain. We included a “special question” as an addi-
tional item on the final exam. The experiment was in three
different classes: TP1 and TP2 with students in the Business
Degree program and TP3 3 with students in the Law and Busi-
ness Degree program. These three groups consisted of 51, 53
and 31 students, respectively.
The TM1 session was conducted in February 2006 at
the University of Granada. The group was comprised of
39 students from Microeconomics I; a first-year course in
economics. Identical first-year students are used for TM2
(February 2009) and TM3 (February 2012) with 65 and 70
students respectively.
Finally, the TN session was also conducted at the Univer-
sity of Granada in February 2006. The sample was composed
of 40 students from Microeconomics I; a first-year course in
the Business Administration program.
The format of the classroom experiment was chosen to
ensure the maximum participation of the social networks un-
der scrutiny. If subjects named friends or acquaintances who
were not present at the sessions, the corresponding links were
removed from the network since correspondence could not
be checked.2 This problem is due to simultaneous play in
2As for the TP sessions, in Net 1 (2) [3] we removed 10 (8) [12] links
out of a total number of 175 (160) [289], that is, a percentage of 5.7% (5%)
[4%], respectively. The rate of link removal for the TM and TN sessions, Net
4 and Net 5, were much higher (both around 19%). This is because they were
our experimental design. This feature has the advantage that
subjects could not agree to name each other during the experi-
ment. The main disadvantage is that we could only consider
subjects who were present as network nodes.
COORD-II: experimental instructions3
Hello, you are now going to take part in an economic experi-
ment. We thank you in advance for your collaboration. This is
part of a project coordinated by a teacher from the University
of Alicante who has requested your collaboration to carry it
out. The aim of this experiment is to study how individuals
make decisions in certain environments. The instructions are
simple.
If you follow them carefully, you will receive an additional
POINT TOWARDS YOUR FINAL GRADE IN MICROECO-
NOMICS II [AMOUNT OF MONEY] confidentially at the
end of the experiment.
You may ask questions at any time. To do so, just raise
your hand, but do not speak. Except for these questions, any
kind of communication between you is forbidden and will be
cause for expulsion from the experiment.
Please write a list with the name and surname of all your
friends in the class. Next to their names, you have to write a
number:
1 if you hardly know him/her;
conducted during a regular lesson. Given that they were not run during an
exam, maximum group attendance could not be guaranteed.
3The differences between TP and TM (TM in brackets) are highlighted in
CAPITAL letters.
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TP1 TP2 TP3 µTP TM1 TM2 TM3 µTM µTN
Mutual D = 0 180 82 98 120 37 85 74 65 3
D = 1 34 31 16 27 33 16 40 24 2
D > 1 6 2 0 3 0 2 6 2 0
Total 220 115 114 150 70 103 120 97 5
(76%) (70%) (75%) (74%) (69%) (74%) (75%) (73%) (5%)
Not Mut. 69 50 38 52 32 35 40 36 98
links 289 165 152 202 102 138 160 133 103
sub jects 53 51 31 135 39 65 70 174 40
Table 1. COORD-II: link correspondence across treatments.
2 if he/she is an acquaintance;
3 if he/she is your friend;
4 if he/she is a very close friend.
How do I GET THE POINT [RECEIVE THE MONEY]?
We will take your list and randomly choose the name of one
(only one) of your friends (the ones you have mentioned). We
will then look at your friend’s list and see whether:
i) he/she has mentioned you and
ii) he/she has given you a similar score to the score you
have given him/her (by ”similar” we mean a maximum differ-
ence of one point between the two scores).
If i) and ii) are affirmative, you will win THE POINT [5
e]. If i) or ii) fails, then you will win nothing (0 POINT [0
e]).
Let me give you an example. My list is:
• Jose Pe´rez with a 3.
• Juan Martı´nez with a 4.
• Emilio Lo´pez with a 1.
• Jose Antonio Rodrı´guez with a 2.
Jose´ Pe´rez is then randomly chosen from my list. The
experimenter then looks at Jose´ Pe´rez’ list and sees that he has
given me a score of 4. Given that the difference in scores was
just one point, I win THE POINT FOR MICROECONOMICS
II [5 e]. If I had given Jose´ Pe´rez a score of 2 points, I would
win nothing.
NOTICE 1. If you mention no-one, you also receive THE
POINT FOR MICROECONOMICS II [5 e].
NOTICE 2. (about the above notice ). Be aware that if
you mention no-one, but someone mentions you, this may
be prejudicial to him or her. In other words, a friend who
mentions you would not receive THE POINT FOR MICROE-
CONOMICS II [5 e] because you didn’t include him/her on
your list of friends
For the TNI treatment, instructions were as follows:
”Hello, you are now going to take part in an economic
experiment. We thank you in advance for your collabora-
tion. This is part of a project coordinated by a teacher from
the University of Alicante who has requested your collabo-
ration to carry it out. The aim of this experiment is to study
how individuals make decisions in certain environments. The
instructions are simple.
You can ask questions at any time. To do so, just raise
your hand, but do not speak. Except for these questions, any
kind of communication between you is forbidden and will be
cause for expulsion from the experiment.
Please write a list with the name and surname of all your
friends in the class. Next to their names, you have to write a
number:
1 if you hardly know him/her;
2 if he/she is an acquaintance;
3 if he/she is your friend;
4 if he/she is a very close friend.
Thank you very much.”
Map of networks across different means of
rewards
Cobo-Reyes and Jime´nez (2012) elicit classroom social net-
works under three means of reward: 3 networks under TP
-TP1 to TP3 - with 53 (289 links), 51 (165 links) and 31 (152
links) subjects, respectively; three networks under TM -TM1
to TM3- with 39 (102 links), 65 (138 links) and 71 (160 links)
subjects, respectively, and one TN network, with 40 subjects
(103 links). Figures 4 to 6 display the network maps for TP2,
TM3 and TN, repsectively.
The elicited networks, displayed in Figure 4 and 5, share
most features of typical social network architecture (see New-
man 2010). More precisely, there is a giant component encom-
passing 42 (61%) and 43 (82%) of network vertices for TP2
and TM3, respectively; the second largest component only
contains 7 and 5 nodes and there are 0 (0%) and 9 (13%) un-
connected nodes, for TP2 and TM3, respectively. The average
(undirected) degree is 4.36 neighbors (Std. Dev. 1.87) and
3.46 (Std. Dev. 2.44), respectively. The clustering coefficient,
i.e., the average fraction of links of a node that are linked
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Figure 2. Resulting network using monetary rewards (TM3): 71 subjects and 160 links
themselves, is 0.45 and 0.53, respectively. Notice that, in a
randomly generated network of the same size and connectiv-
ity, the expected clustering would be roughly 4.36/165=0.026
and 3.46/160=0.022, one order of magnitude lower that the
observed level. We also observe small distances (the average
and maximum distance, diameter, in the giant component are
3.73 and 11, 4.32 and 11, for TP2 and TM3, respectively).
Figure 3. Resulting network using no rewards (TN): 40 subjects
and 103 links
